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"EXCLUSIVE AGENCY" AGREEMENTS AND THEIR REVOCABILITY
If for a consideration an owner of land gives an agent for a specified
period an "exclusive agency" to sell property, it seems to be generally
held that the agreement fairly construed does not ordinarily carry a
promise by the owner to pay a commission if he sells the property him-
self.1 It follows that while the agent acquires a right against the
principal that the property shall not be sold through any other agent,
the principal retains not only the power but also the privilege, as
against the agent, of selling the property himself without incurring any
duty to pay a commission. This interpretation of the words "exclusive
agency" may, however, be shown by other parts of the agreement not
to be a fair one. Where this is so, courts do not hesitate to hold that
the principal is under a duty to pay a commission if he sells the prop-
erty himself.2
'Ingold v. Symons (I9O4) 125 Iowa, 82, 99 N. W. 713; Smith v. Preis (i9z2)
117 Minn. 392, 136.N. W. 7; Mechem, Agency (2d ed., 1914) sec. 2445.
'Hunter v. Wenatchee Land Co. (xgo8) 50 Wash. 438, 97 Pac. 494. Here the
fact that the agent in return agreed to devote "reasonable time and attention
[5751
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If the words of the agreement are that the agent shall have "the
exclusive right to sell" or the "exclusive sale" of the land, it would-
seem that their fair meaning excludes the principal from making a
sale himself without incurring a duty to pay the agent a commission.
It has been so held where the agent paid a cash consideration for the
agreement.3 In the recent case of Roberts v. Harrington (1918, Wis.)
169 N. W. 603, a majority of the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused so
to construe the words "exclusive sale," where at the time the agree-
ment was made the agent gave no consideration of any kind.
4 The
argument in support of this view was that since the agent had given
nothing for the promise "the owner's right [privilege] to sell should
not be construed away upon ambiguous language. The words 'exclu-
sive sale' may well mean 'exclusive agency to sell.'" The minority of
the court, on the other hand, regarded the words "exclusive sale" as
plain and unambiguous. The question is, of course, merely one of the
fair meaning of the words used-a niatter upon which rational human
beings may differ.
Even if we adopt the construction of the words contended for by the
minority in the Wisconsin case, there are difficulties to be overcome
before the principal in that case can be held to be under a duty to pay
the agent a commission. No consideration was originally given for his
promise that the agent should have the "exclusive sale" for the speci-
fied period. The agent did not at the time promise to do anything, and
apparently would have been under no duty to pay damages if he had
made no effort to sell the property. While the majority of the court
did not go into this point in deciding against the agent's claim for a
commission, the minority had to do so in order to find for the agent.
There is thus raised one of the most interesting problems in the law of
contracts.
The agent in the case in hand had, in reliance upon the promise,
made efforts to sell the property, and in doing so had not only done
work but incurred expense. The minority took-the view that there
was therefore a "valid consideration" by reason of "the acceptance
of the contract, the performance of services, and the. expenditure of
money in the execution of it." They do not tell us whether the con-
tractual obligations which arose after the agent had thus furnished
to the sale" of land/and to have it advertised led the court to interpret the
agreement in the manner stated in the text. Frequently the agreement
expressly provides that the commission is payable if the principal sells the
property himself. Kimmell v. Skelly (igoo) 13o Cal. 555, 62 Pac. 3O67.
*Fairchild v. Rogers (3884) 32 Minn. 269, 2o N. W. 191.
'Kerwin and Eschweiler, JJ., dissented. In Schulz v. Griffin (3893, Super.
Ct. Buffalo, N. Y.) 5 Misc. 499, the facts were as in Fairchild v. Rogers except
that after the sale by the principal the agent within the specified time produced
a purchaser ready and able to buy. Recovery was allowed.
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the "consideration" were bilateral or only unilateral. Would the agent
thereafter have been under any contractual duty to continue his efforts
to find a purchaser? Note that so far as appears he had never in
express words promised to do anything. An examination of the cases
seems to show a tendency on the part of some courts to hold that the
resulting contractual obligations are bilateral.5 To be sure, in most
of the cases it was the agent who was suing for his commission. It
may therefore be argued that these cases determine only that there is a
contractual duty on the part of the principal. This raises the ques-
tion whether, if it be admitted that the agent is not bound to go on
even after he has for a time endeavored to sell the property, there is
any theory upon which he can nevertheless hold the principal to the
payment of a commission if the latter sells the property himself or
attempts to "revoke" before a sale is made by the agent. If the
principal had said in express words, "If you will list my property, or
advertise it, and attempt to find a purchaser, I will pay you a com-
mission if either you or anyone else, including myself, sells it within
the next 9o days," it seems clear that he would have been under con-
tractual obligations as soon as the agent had listed the property and
attempted in good faith to sell it. Usually no such express language
is. used. In order to protect the agent from what seems to them an
unfair revocation by the principal, a number of courts have implied
such a promise in fact, i. e., they regard the conduct and words of
the principal taken as a whole as expressing such a promise 8
These problems are but illustrations of the difficulty courts have had
in dealing with what appear at first sight to be offers for unilateral
contracts. When all the evidence is in, we frequently find after all
that what was said and done, fairly interpreted, implied bilateral obli-
gations. Even if not, there is not, as is so often supposed,7 any
difficulty "on principle" in holding that "the offer is irrevocably
accepted by the first unequivocal commencement of the act." s Surely
the law may on grounds of policy determine either that the offer
becomes irrevocable,9 or that a conditional (or inchoate) contractual
'Branif v. Blair (1917, Kan.) 165 Pac. 8x6; Rowan & Co. v. Hull (I9O4)
55 W. Va. 335, 47 S. E. 92; ig L. R. A. (N. S.) 599, note.
'See the cases cited and discussed in Mechem, Agency (2d ed., 1914) sees.
2453-2455.
"As in Ashley, Law of Contracts, 1g1x.
'Sir Frederick Pollock in (1912) 28 L. QUART. Rxv. ioo, reviewing Ashley's
book. Cf. the decision in Blumenthal v. Goodall (i89i) 89 Cal. 251, 26 Pac. 9o6.
'That is, that the offeror has no power (is under a disability) to destroy the
power which the making of the offer conferred upon the offeree. For a dis-
cussion of "irrevocable offers" see Corbin, Offer and Acceptance (917) 26
YALE LAw JouRNAL, i6g, i84-i90, 194-196, and cases there cited; also McGovney,
Irrevocable Offers (914) 27 HARv. L. REv. 654.
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duty 0 then arises, even if we conclude that the agreement, after we
have made all implications of fact, does not so provide but is silent
upon the question. That an ordinary -offer is "revocable," i. e., that
the offeror has the legal power to destroy the power conferred upon the
offeree by the making of the offer, is, when all is said, merely a rule
of positive law based upon notions of policy. It has no connection
with the "nature of offers" as such." Nor is it based upon any
implication of fact, for this power of revocation exists even if the offer
contains a promise not to revoke for a definite period, unless indeed
that promise is either under seal or made for a consideration.
2 In
some other systems of law no power of revocation exists unless the
terms of the offer provide for it. Obviously therefore, without
doing violence to any principle, our law may, as soon as the acts
requested have been begun, and-even though they have not been
finished, either make the offer irrevocable or, preferably, create a con-
ditional or inchoate duty to perform, which will become a complete
duty as soon as the conditions have been complied with. In the prin-
cipal case-assuming the construction of the language adopted by the
minority-these conditions were that either the agent or the principal
or some other person sell the property in question. This had occurred,
and the agent was therefore entitled to his commission. Such a result,
it is submitted, is more in accord with the notions and the needs of the
business community than that reached by the majority.
"The adjectives conditional and inchoate are here used to express the idea
that the right will not be an unconditional or complete right to payment until
a future event happens-here a sale by the principal or some one else. Cf. the
remarks of Cockburn, C.J., in Frost v. Knight (1872) L. R. 7 E. ,i--"The
promisee has an inchoate right to the performance of the bargain [before the
time for performance has come] which becomes complete when the time for
performance has arrived [and all conditions precedent have been fulfilled].
In the meantime he has a right to have the contract kept open as a subsisting
and effective contract." Accepting the doctrine of anticipatory breach thus
expressed,-and the majority of courts do so-if in the situation under con-
sideration the principal should "revoke" after the agent had accepted by
using efforts to find a purchaser, the agent could sue at once if he so wished.
" Compare Langdell, Summary of the Law of Contracts, sec. 178. "An offer
which contains no stipulation as to how long it shall continue, as it confers
no right upon the offeree, is in its nature revocable at any moment.... An
offer which the party making it has no power to revoke, is a legal impossi-
bility." The italics are those of the present writer. Cf. note 9, supra.
' See the citations in note 9, supra.
' Swiss Code of Obligations, sec. 3; German Civil Code, sec. 145; Japanese
Civil Code, art. 251.
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THE CONCLUSIVENESS OF STATE JUDGMENTS UNDER THE FULL
FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE
In the case of Smithan v. Gray (1918, Mich.) 168 N. W. 998, the
plaintiff's claim was based upon a Pennsylvania judgment. One of
the defenses relied upon was that the defendant had never been served
with process nor given any notice of the suit. In sustaining the validity
of this defense the Michigan Court said:
"When a suit upon a foreign judgment is brought in the courts of
this State, that judgment may be impeached for lack of jurisdiction
in the foreign court to render the same, irrespective of the recital of
jurisdiction contained in the record of judgment."
While agreeing, for reasons hereafter stated, with the actual deci-
sion, one may well express doubts of the accuracy of the reasoning
upon which it was based. To begin with, a judgment of a sister state
is not a "foreign judgment" in the ordinary sense of that term. Under
the full faith and credit clause of the United States Constitution and the
statute passed by Congress in pursuance thereof, the Pennsylvania judg-
ment created in Michigan a "debt of record" and was entitled to the
"same faith and credit", to which it was entitled" by law or usage in the
courts of the State from which" it was taken.' Nothing but confusion
can result from calling such a judgment a "foreign judgment" with-
out explanation or recognition of the fact that it stands in the Michigan
courts upon a different footing from judgments rendered by courts in
foreign countries. That the judgment even of a sister state may be
impeached for "lack of jurisdiction," however, is a well-recognized
rule,2 and it may well be asked in what way as regards the question
before the court siach a judgment differs from a truly foreign judg-
ment.
The first difference-one which courts who confuse the two seem
to forget-is that the faith and credit to be given to the judgments of
a foreign country, as distinguished from those of other states, is a
matter left for each state to settle as it pleases, whereas the faith and
credit to be given to judgments of sister states is fixed by federal and
not by state law.3 The federal law upon the subject requires each
'U. S. Const. Art. 4, sec. I; U. S. Rev. St. sec. 905.
'See the authorities discussed below in notes 7 and 8.
'In Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Snith (Igo4) 185 Mass. 363, 70 N. F.
426, in which the suit was based upon an Illinois judgment, the court said:
"When the judgment debtor sues here, his defenses are not regulated by the
law of Illinois but by the law of Massachusetts." (The italics are the present
writer's.) Nowhere in the opinion is there an iniimation that there is such
a thing as the full faith and credit clause or an act of Congress dealing with
the matter. The' actual decision in the case is equally extraordinary, as is
shown in note 17, infra.
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state to give to state judgments "such faith and credit as they have
by law or usage in the courts of the State from which they
are taken."' However, in order to be entitled to this faith and credit
the alleged judgments must be valid judgments, i. e., they must have
been rendered by a court that had "jurisdiction." This word, like so
many of our legal words and phrases, is ambiguous. As applied to
courts its primary significance is power to take valid action which will
stand until reversed by some higher judicial tribunal.-' With refer-
ence to a given person a state court may lack such power for
either one or both of two reasons: (i) because facts do not exist
which confer upon the State of whose governmental organization the
court is a part, "jurisdiction" to alter the defendant's legal relations
by state judicial action; (2) because, although these facts do exist,
there has been no compliance with the rules of law in force in the partic-
ular State in question, which govern the acquisition by the court of
"jurisdiction" to alter the defendant's legal relations. If with refer-
ence to a given defendant the facts exist necessary to confer "juris-
diction" upon the state generally, and there is a compliance with the
rules of law established by the state for the acquisition by the court of
jurisdiction over him, any personal judgment that may be rendered
will necessarily be valid and entitled to full faith and credit.
6 To
determine, therefore, whether an alleged personal judgment of one
state is entitled to full faith and credit in other states we must satisfy
ourselves of these two things.
Consistently with common-law notions as to "jurisdiction" of an
independent state or country, our courts have held that, so far as the
entry of a personal judgment is concerned, no one of our states has
jurisdiction over a defendant not within its borders unless he is a
citizen of the state in question or submits to the jurisdiction.
7 A
"judgment" entered against such a defendant who does not submit to
the jurisdiction is therefore not entitled to full faith and credit.
8 This
is the point actually determined in a large number of the cases com-
monly cited to establish the proposition that in a suit in one state on
the judgment of another state the jurisdiction of the court to render
the original judgment may always be inquired into by the court in
which the new suit is brought.
'The italics are the present writer's.
'See Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity (9,5) 15 COLUmBIA L. REv. io6.
'Because of limitations of space the discussion is confined to so-called per-
sonal judgments.
7Pennoyer v. Neff (1877) 95 U. S. 714; (I917) 26 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 492.
Our common-law notions of "jurisdiction" -in this sense are to some extent
arbitrary, as well as at variance with ideas prevailing in civil law countries.
'Knowles v. Gaslight and Coke Co. (1873 U. S.) ig Wall. 58; Old Wayne
Life Association v. McDonough (19o7) 204 U. S. 8, 27 Sup. Ct. 236.
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Carefully to be distinguished from the cases just discussed are those
in which the defendant was in the state, or, if out of it, was at least a
citizen of it, at the time of the proceedings which terminated in the
judgment. As the state had "jurisdiction" over him, the only ques-
tion is the second one, viz., were the rules for the acquisition by the
court of jurisdiction complied with? It is at this point, it is believed,
that some courts have gone astray. A defendant in a suit in one state
on an alleged judgment of another state, although admitting that he
was in the state or a citizen thereof at the time of the proceedings
which terminated in the "judgment," claims to be entitled to show that
he was never personally served. In the view of the present writer,
whether he is entitled to do this depends upon whether the rules of
law in force in the state in which he was, or of which he was a citizen,
made the judgment valid without such service. If they do, then the
judgment is valid and entitled in other states to full faith and credit.
Our inquiry then shifts to the question: under what circumstances,
if any, do the laws in force in the various states make possible the
rendering of a valid personal judgment without personal service?
Lack of space forbids the discussion of more than a single class, viz.,
those in which, although there actually was no service or notice of the
suit, the record contains a return by the proper officer, of personal
service made.9 It is the law in many states that the return by the
proper officer of personal service within the jurisdictidn cannot be
attacked, either in the proceeding itself,10 or collaterally,"' or even by
bill in equity. 2 The defendant's only recourse in such a state is a
suit against the sheriff or his bondsmen. This view, which does not
represent the law in a large number of states, 8 has been vigorously
'If the record contains no such recital and there was actually no service,
where the law in force required it, the alleged "judgment" is of course a
nullity both in the state in which rendered and elsewhere. Price v. Schaeffer
(1894) i6i Pa. 530, 29 Atl. 279.
'Regent Realty Co. v. Armour Packing Co. (i9O5) 112 Mo. App. 271, 86 S. W.
88o; and cases cited in the monographic note in iz4 Am. St. Rep. 757, 758.
Allurd v. Voller (1897) 112 Mich. 357, 70 N. W. 1o37; and cases cited in
1z4 Am. St Rep. 768.
' Taylor v. Lewis (1829, Ky.) 2 J. J. Marsh. 400; Smoot v. Judd (1904) 184
Mo. 5o8, 83 S. W. 48r; Reiger v. Mullins (i9o8) 210 Mo. 563, 1o9 S. W. n6.
In the prevailing and dissenting opinions in the second of these cases the
authorities are exhaustively reviewed. See also note in i24 Am. St. Rep. 764.
The plaintiff must, of course, be unaware of the falsity of the return.
Compare the similar rule as to the unauthorized appearance of attorney.
Bunton v. Lyford (i859) 37 N. H. 512. Contra: Vitas v. Plattsburgh, etc., R.
(i8go) 123 N. Y. 440, 25 N. E. 941. See 21 L. R. A. 855.
'In many, perhaps most, jurisdictions there is no way in which a defendant
who is not served may attack the lack of service, for if he appears in order to
raise the question he thereby removes the defect. In a few jurisdictions by
express statutory provision, the law seems to be to the contrary. Dozier v.
Lamb (1877) 59 Ga. 461; Waring v. McKinley (1862, N. Y.) 62 Barb. 6i. In
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denounced as unjust by judges and text writers,
1 4 but was followed by
the Supreme Court of the United States in an early case'
5 and later
upheld as not violating the "due process of law" provided for by the
Fourteenth Amendment.' It is the contention of the present writer
that inasmuch as a judgment of this kind-rendered against a person
subject to the general jurisdiction of the State-is a valid judgment,
-it must be treated by the courts of other states as -such, and given full
faith and credit. This has not always been done."
If the foregoing is sound, it follows that if in a suit in one state on a
judgment of another state want of service is set up, the proof of such
want of service may or may not show "lack of jurisdiction" in the
court which rendered the judgment. If the defendant was at the time
within the state or was a citizen of it, then, according to the law of
many states-although not of all-the court had jurisdiction, i. e.
power, to enter an absolutely binding judgment in spite of the lack of
service, provided the officer's return of service contained a recital that
personal service was had. Such a judgment, obtained in such a state,
is therefore entitled in other states to the same faith and credit that
it has in the state in which it was rendered.'
8  It follows further-con-
a large number, however, he may raise the question collaterally or obtain relief
in equity. Watson v. Watson (1827) 6 Conn. 334, in which the court recog-
nized that they were departing from the common law as established in 
the
English decisions. In some, he must show not only lack of service, but also
that he has a meritorious defense. Meyer v. Wilson (igoo) 166 Ind. 651, 76
N. E. 748, and cases in 54 Am. St. Rep. 2; 124 Am. St. Rep. 766. In others,
all that need be shown is the lack of service. Ridgeway v. Bank of Tennessee
(i85o, Tenn.) ii Humph. 525.
" See the dissenting opinion in Smoot v. Judd, supra, note 12; and the mono-
graphic note in 14 Am. St. Rep. 756.
' Walker v. Robbins (1852, U. S.) 14 How. 584. The doctrine was re-affirmed
in Knox County v. Harshman (i889) 133 U. S. 152, 10 Sup. Ct. 257. In both
cases equitable relief was denied.
1'Miedrich v. Lauenstein (1913) 232 U. S. 236, 34 Sup. Ct. 3o9. If the
defendant was neither a resident nor a citizen of the state at the time of the
proceedings, and yet temporarily within the state's borders, it is perhaps
doubtful whether the state would be recognized as having jurisdiction to bind
him by a recital of service where none in fact was had. It may be that his
position would be assimilated to that of the non-citizen who is at the same
time a non-resident; nevertheless, the contrary view has arguments to support
it. No case involving the question has been found.
'1 In Chicago Title and Trust Co. v. Smith, cited supra, note 3, the Massa-
chusetts court held that even though it were assumed that the recitals of
service in the Illinois judgment there sued upon could not be questioned in
Illinois, they could be controverted in the Massachusetts suit and this, even
though the recitals of service in a Massachusetts judgment could not be ques-
tioned.
' Wilcox v. Kassick (1851) 2 Mich. 165; Lapham v. Briggs (1854) 27 Vt.
26. In both cases the court assumed that the law of the state in which the
judgment sued on was rendered made the recital of service conclusive, as was
the case at common law.
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trary to the assertion of the Michigan court in the passage quoted
above-that "recitals [in state judgments] of jurisdiction," i. e., of
jurisdictional facts, are sometimes conclusive upon the courts of other
states. If the defendant was beyond the jurisdiction of the state, they
are not conclusive; if he was subject to the state's jurisdiction they
may be made conclusive-at least so far as service of process is con-
cerned-if the state law so declares. If so made, they are then entitled
to full faith and credit. Consequently, when suit is brought in another
state upon such a judgment, before the court can determine whether
the defendant may show want of service in order to show lack of
jurisdiction, it must first of all inquire into the law of the state render-
ing the original judgment. If that law makes the recital of service con-
clusive, it will, in all cases in which the defendant at the time of the
alleged service either was in the state concerned or was a citizen
thereof, be conclusive in all other states.19
W. W. C.
APPEALS FROM JUDGMENTS OF PRIZE coURTs
A recent decision of the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council in
The Stigstad (1918, P. C.) 35 Times L. R. 176, again emphasizes the
anomalous character of the jurisdiction of prize courts.' In that case
a Norwegian vessel bound from Norway to Rotterdam with iron-ore
briquettes belonging to neutrals but alleged to be destined to Germany,
was stopped on the high seas under the Order in Council of March ii,
1915, and ordered to discharge her cargo. The Order, admittedly a
measure of retaliation against the German war-zone decree, undertook,
without establishing a legal blockade, to prohibit all commerce to
neutral ports in cargo bound to or from Germany.2 In the instant case
the neutral cargo was sold by consent and a sum allowed for freight,
but the claim of the neutral vessel for detention and expenses was
dismissed3 on the ground that (I) with respect to the necessity for
reprisals, the court is concluded by'the recitals of the Order in Council;
'In the case before the Michigan court the suit was on a Pennsylvania judg-
ment. It happens that that State permits a return of service to be attacked
in a suit on a judgment, so that the result reached by the Michigan court was
correct. The doctrine announced in the opinion, however, will, if followed,
ultimately lead to error in other cases.
'See 2 Westlake, Int. L., 289.
'The American protest characterizing the Order in Council as illegal may be
found in an instruction of the Secretary of State to Ambassador Page, March 3o,
X915, Special Suppl. to (I9,5) 9 AMEi. J. IN~r. L., 1I6. The Order itself will
be found at p. nio.
'The Stigstad [1916] P. 123, affirmed by the Privy Council, (1918) 35 Times
L. R. 176.
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and that (2) in its enforcement no excessive hardship was imposed on
neutrals. The effect of the opinion is that when belligerents by way
of reciprocal retaliation depart from recognized rules of international
law, it is the function of belligerent prize courts to determine how
far neutrals must suffer losses without redress.
The decision illustrates the peculiar nature of the prize jurisdiction
and the reason for the rule that prize decisions are not and should not
be internationally conclusive. Such a decision is final as between 
the
captors and the original owners so far as concerns private title in 
rem.,
But the government whose citizen is aggrieved by the decision may
always contest it and hold the State in whose court it was rendered
internationally responsible for unjust, and even for erroneous judg-
ments due to misapprehension or misapplication of the rules 
of inter-
national law. This is especially true where the court applies 
the
regularly decreed rules of municipal law in derogation of rules 
of
international law.
The jurisdiction of the prize court and the extent of its subservience
to municipal rules contravening international law is not entirely 
clear.
Were it really to apply international law in disregard of contravening
provisions of municipal law, there might be less foundation for an
international protest, although it has been repeatedly asserted that
foreign governments will not permit a municipal judgment which mis-
interprets or violates international law to be set up as a bar to an inter-
national claim.5 A fortiori, this conclusion follows when the court
admittedly applies .municipal law regardless of its consistency with
international law."
Lord Stowell in The Mario7 asserted with firmness that he applied
the law of nations only. Some twelve years later, however, when in
i8ii s he came to deal with the Orders in Council by which a paper
blockade of France was declared as a retaliatory measure for the Berlin
and Milan decrees of Napoleon, he admitted that the King in council
had "legislative" powers over the prize court which the court was
bound to obey. But he avoided any admission that the Orders were
violative of international law by acting upon the presumption-which
apparently was "not rebuttable"-that as reprisals were a recog-
'The Countess of Lauderdale (18o2, Eng. Adm.) 4 C. Rob. 283, 286; Williams
v. Armroyd (1813, U. S.) 7 Cranch, 423.
'Wheaton, Int. Law (8th ed. by Dana, 1866) secs. 392-397; Martens, Pricis,
sec. 97; Borchard, Diplomatic Protection of Citizens Abroad, 342.
'Mr. Bayard, See'y of State, to the President, Feb. 26, 1887, 6 Moore, Digest
of Int. Law, 667; Howland (U. S.) v. Mexico, Apr. 11, 1839, Moore, Arb. 3227;
Mather and Glover (U. S.) v. Mexico, July 4, 1868, ibid. 3231.
" (1799, Eng. Adm.) i C. Rob. 340, 350; see also The Recovery (18o7, Eng.
Adm.) 6 C. Rob. 341, 349; see the American case of The Divina Pastora
(x8ig, U. S.) 4 Wheat 52.
" Tke Fox (181i, Eng. Adm.) Edwards;, 31.
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nized belligerent weapon the orders conformed to the law of nations.9
This is very much like Marshall's opinion that "An act of Congress
ought never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other
possible construction remains." 10  With practically no exception the
courts have adhered to this injunction not to confess such violation.
This, indeed, it is generally unnecessary to admit, for there is a higher
forum in which that issue :s settled, namely, the Executive, through
recourse to diplomatic channels.1
During the present war a new development seemed to have been
inaugurated, in that the prize court asserted its independence of execu-
tive, although not of legislative, control. In The Zamora&2 the Privy
Council refused to give effect to an Order in Council issued under the
King's prerogative, empowering the officers of the Crown to requisition
ships in the prize court before a final decree of condemnation had been
made. Lord Parker took occasion in a lengthy opinion to declare the
court's freedom from executive control in the sense of compulsory
obedience to an Executive Order issued under the prerogative, and he
characterized as dictum Lord Stowell's declaration that the King in
Council possessed "legislative" powers over the court. The decision
has been regarded as epoch-making, but its scope can only be deter-
mined by experience. Some limitations have already become apparent.
It applies only to one type of Order in Council, namely, that issued
under the prerogative, and not to Orders issued under parliamentary
authority, for it is conceded that Parliament can declare the law to be
applied by the prize court. Moreover, even as to prerogative orders
Lord Parker stated: "It cannot be assumed that any executive order
is contrary to law,"--a declaration which in application will probably
be found to resemble closely Marshall's injunction. - He added further
that the court "will act on [Executive Orders] in every case in which
they amount to a mitigation of the Crown rights in favour of the enemy
or neutral, as the case may be." In The Proton s opportunity was
given for the application of this declaration to an Order in Council
which mitigated the Crown rights by adopting that provision of the
Declaration of London, article 57, which determined the nationality of a
vessel by her flag. But such a criterion would have resulted in the
'See the extracts from the EDInBuRGH REviEw for February, 1812, comment-
ing upon this weakening in Lord Stowell's position as to the law administered
in the prize court, quoted in 7 Moore, Digest, 648.
"0Murray v. The Charming Betsey (18o4, U. S.) 2 Cranch, 64, ixi. See also
Little v. Barreme (18o4, U. S.) 2 Cranch, i7o. Under our law the courts are
bound by municipal statutes, regardless of their inconsistency with interna-
tional law.
See Ex parte Larrucca (1917, S. D. Cal.) 249 Fed. 98i; (ig8) 28 YALE
LAw JoURNAL, 83.
(P. C.) [i916] 2 A. C. 77.
(P. C.) [i918] A. C. 578, 34 Times L. R. 309.
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release of a captured vessel rightfully flying the Greek flag. It -was
therefore decided to disregard the Order in Council by applying the
general rule of international law which determined a vessel's nationality
by all the relevant circumstances,'A--which in this case pointed to her
German ownership. While international law rather than the Order in
Council was held to constitute the guiding rule of the Court, it can
hardly be said that this result was not influenced by the fact that the
belligerent's rights were thereby better safeguarded. And in the Stig-
stad,15 the Privy Council reverted to the position of Lord Stowell in
The Fox by admitting the legitimacy of reprisals and retaliation as a
belligerent weapon, and by refusing to consider as inconsistent with
international law a Government measure of reprisal which has been
universally so considered by neutrals. In theory, while concluded as
to the necessity for retaliation by the Executive determination, the
court is not precluded from holding unlawful the measure actually
adopted. The necessity for reprisals being admitted, the neutral's only
objection, it seems, must be confined to a claim that he suffers more
inconvenience from the retaliatory measure than is reasonably neces-
sary, an objection passed upon by a prize court of the accused bellig-
erent. The German prize courts have gone still further, and frankly
assert that they are municipal courts and will not apply a rule of inter-
national law if inconsistent with a rule laid down by municipal law or
executive order for their guidance. 6
The conclusion is obvious that the decision of a prize court, whether
professing to apply international law or municipal law, cannot be bind-
ing upon a foreign government whose citizen is aggrieved by such
decision. It is unnecessary to allege bad faith in the prize court.
Probably no courts have shown greater probity and fairness than those
presided over by Lord Stowel 17 and Sir Samuel Evans; yet it is
inevitable that public policy, important as a factor of judicial decision
in time of peace, should be even more potent in time of war to persuade
courts to confer "advantages upon their own governments. In view of
their dependence upon municipal statute and their deference in large
degree to Executive Order, the prize courts act practically at once as
prosecutors and judges, a system not calculated to evoke confidence in
14Battcn v. The Queen (x857) Ii Moore P. C. 27!; Rogers v. The Amado
(x847, D. C. E. D. La.) 2o Fed. Cas., No. 2oo5.
' (r9i8, P. C.) 35 Times . R. 176.
"The Elida, May 18, I915 (Berlin Prize Court) xo Axmza. . INT. L (1916)
916; Watanabe, T., Dos Prisenverfahren (Jena, 1903) 3r. See also quotations
from The Zaanstroom and text writers printed in Huberich and King, The
Development of German Price Law (New York r918) o-z3. -
'It has been computed that 4o per cent of Lord Stowell's prize decisions
were in favor of neutrals, and the record of American prize courts in this
respect is good.
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their impartiality. Prize procedure is still far from the point of devel-
opment attained by municipal criminal procedure.'
The anomalous character of the prize decision induced Martin
Hfibner,19 the Danish jurist, in the middle of the eighteenth century,
to advocate an international prize appeal. Others have followed him.
2 0
The practice of nations discloses a certain readiness to submit the
decisions of municipal prize courts to the appellate judgment of inter-
national tribunals. American contributions to that practice are to be
found in article VII of the Jay treaty of 1794, under which large
indenmities were recovered from Great Britain for seizures mad under
Orders in Council violating neutral rights; and similar indemnities
were obtained from France, Spain, Naples and Denmark.2' Under
article XII of the Treaty of Washington, May 8, 1871, British subjects
appealed from decisions of American prize courts and in six such cases
the arbitral tribunal established by that treaty reversed the decision of
the United States Supreme Court 2 2 Diplomatic correspondence
reveals innumerable protests against prize decisions. Both Great
Britain and the United States when the European war broke out were
still protesting against those of the Russo-Japanese War. Recognition
of the weakness of municipal prize courts prompted the Hague plan
for the establishment of an International Prize Court, which failed of
successful achievement because of the inability of the nations to agree
upon a scheme of representation on the court. Its necessity has been
fully demonstrated by the war. It is to be hoped that the nations will
prove their devotion to principles of justice by presenting no obstacles
to the institution of an international forum for the hearing of appeals
from municipal prize decisions rendered during the war,23 and of a
similar forum for the adjudication of other pecuniary claims. By the
removal of such purely legal questions from the political channels of
diplomacy to the arena of judicial settlement the nations will be able
to afford concrete evidence of the efficacy of an international court of
justice.
E. M. B.
"'Even in backward countries governments scrutinize decisions in criminal
cases affecting their citizens to assure themselves of the complete independence
of executive and judiciary.
12 Hfibner, De la saisie des bdtiments neutres (La Haye, 1759) 32.
" See the exhaustive study on the theory of prize law, with citation of
authorities, by A. Bulmerincq, in (1876) II Revue de Droit Internat. 152, 176 ff.
'Moore, Arb. 32o9 ff.; 4550 ff.
'The Hiawatha (1862, U. S.) 2 Black, 635, Moore, Arb. 39o2; The Circas-
sian (1864, U. S.) 2 WalL 135, Moore, Arb. 39ii; The Springbok (1866, U. S.)
5 Wail. i, Moore, Arb. 3928; The Sir William Peel (i866, U. S.) 5 Wall. 517,
Moore, Arb. 3935; The Volant (i866, U. S.) 5 Wall. i79, Moore, Arb. 3950;
The Science (i866, U. S.) 5 Wall. x78, Moore, Arb. 3950.
'In this connection see the proposal of Governor Baldwin, An Anglo-Amer-
ican Prize Tribunal, in (1915) 9 Am J. T. L. 297.
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ABUSE OF EMINENT DOMAIN PROCESS
The Supreme Judicial Court of Maine has lately been called upon
to determine whether a corporation clothed with the "power of eminent
domain"1 is liable in tort for having hindered and prevented timbering
operations on land by commencing condemnation proceedings, without
"malice" or bad faith, professedly for a "public" but in fact for a
"private purpose," there being no physical interference with the plain-
tiff's possession. The facts in the case show that the defendant water
company, a quasi-public corporation, filed the statutory notice of
"taking" the plaintiff's land, professedly for the protection of a body
of water necessary for its "public purpose," and petitioned the court
for a determination of the damages. The plaintiff obtained a tem-
porary injunction restraining the taking on the ground that the land in
question afforded no protection to the water company's pond and was,
therefore, not necessary to the defendant's public purpose. Thereupon
a decision was rendered in another suit2 in equity that other land located,
like that of the plaintiff, across the water-shed from the pond, afforded
no protection to the water supply and that the condemnation of it was
a taking for a "private purpose." On this the defendant filed notice
of the "abandonment" of the proceedings to acquire the plaintiff's
land; the plaintiff's temporary injunction was made permanent; and he
brought this action for damages. The court assumed, apparently by
agreement of the parties, that the plaintiff's land afforded no protection
to the -pond and that the taking was for a private purpose. It con-
cluded that the plaintiff was justified in suspending timbering opera-
tions on the land from the time the defendant filed the notice of taking
until the notice of abandonment was received, and that he could recover
the damages actually suffered during that period. Sidelinker v. York
Shore Water Co. (1918, Me.) io5 Atl. 122.3
'This so-called "power" of eminent domain, often termed the "right" of
eminent domain, is a loose and somewhat misleading phrase. It is usually
employed as a substitute for an accurate analysis of the legal relations in describ-
ing a particular mode of transfer of the legal interest in land. An analysis is
developed in the text.
'Bowdens v. York Shore Water Co. (915) 114 Me. 150, 95 At. 779.
'It appeared that the real purpose of the water company in attempting to
acquire this land, which was about a mile distant from the crest of the water-
shed of its water supply, was to protect its own timber growing on the inter-
vening territory. Part of the land sought was owned by the plaintiff and the
remainder by one Bowden. Condemnation proceedings were commenced against
both. The company elected to have the court determine whether the "taking"
was for a public or private purpose in the Bowden proceedings before continu-
ing the proceedings against the plaintiff. The plaintiff secured a temporary
injunction and then entered into an agreement with the defendant to abide by
the finding of the court in the Bowden case. The issues being found against the
water company, a notice of the abandonment of the proceedings against the
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According to the weight of authority, in the absence of statutory
provisions a party who has instituted proceedings to take land neces-
sary for a public purpose has the legal power as well as the privilege
to abandon the same at any time before the determination of compensa-
tion.4 According to some cases this may be done even after the
determination of compensation, on the theory that the effect of the
proceedings prior to such abandonment is simply to fix the price at
which the appropriator can acquire the land ; that this so-called assess-
ment of damages is in the nature of an offer by the owner, which must
be accepted by the appropriator within a reasonable time.' The Maine
rule is that the proceedings cannot be abandoned after the determina-
tion of compensation, i. e., that the power and the privilege of the
appropriator to abandon are extinguished by the award.7  Some courts,
while recognizing that a legal power to abandon exists, have refused
to recognize that the appropriator is privileged to abandon the pro-
ceedings if there has been physical interference with the landowner's
possession, or misconduct, or unnecessary delay either in the prosecu-
tion or the abandonment of the proceedings. In such cases, therefore,
an action for damages is allowed.8 The gravamen of the complaint
in the principal case was not the same as in those last cited but, as
stated by the court, the "wrongful initiation of condemnation pro-
ceedings."
Before undertaking to determine why the initiation of the proceed-
ings was wrongful in the principal case, it may be well to examine more
plaintiff's land was filed; the temporary injunction was made permanent and
the plaintiff commenced his action for damages. A period of more than two
years had elapsed from the filing of the defendant's notice of "taking" until
the notice of abandonment was received. During this time, the plaintiff had sus-
pended timbering operations on his land.
"Southern etc. Water Co. v. Cameron (i9o3) 141 Cal. 283, 74 Pac. 838; Sinmp-
son v. Kansas City (1892) iii Mo. 237, 20 S. W. 38; Milwaukee etc. R. R. v.
Stolke (z898) ioi Wis. 9r, 76 N. W. ii13.
'This would especially seem to be the rule where municipal corporations were
involved. O'Neill v. Freeholders of Hudson (1879, Ct Err.) 41 N. J. L. 161.
Stevens v. Danbury (I885) 53 Conn. 9; Chicago v. Hayward (1898) 176 Ill. i3o,
52 N. E. 26; Simpson v. Kansas City, jupra.
'2 Nichols, Eminent Domain, lios. Of course there is no real "offer" by
the owner; ill that such a way of putting the matter can mean is that the
resulting legal situation is similar to that resulting from an offer.
'Furbish, Petitioner, v. County Commissioners (1918) 93 Me. 117, 44 Atl. 364.
This rule has also been adhered to in other jurisdictions. Union Ry. Co. v.
Standard Wheel Co. (19o6) z49 Fed. 698, 779 C. C. A. 386; The City of Terre
Haute v. Blake (i893) 9 Ind. App. 403, 36 N. E. 932. Drath v. B. & M. R. R.
Co. (1884) I5 Neb. 367; People v. Brooklyn (1828, Sup. Ct) I Wend. 318.
'Pittsburgh, Fort Wayne & Chicago Ry. v. Swinney (1884) 97 Ind. 586; Van
Valkenburgh v. Milwaukee (1878) 43 Wis. 574. Leisse v. St. Louis etc. R. R.
(1876) 2 Mo. App. ios, approved by the Supreme Court (i88o) 72 Mo. 561.
Hullin, Syndic, et al. v. Second Municipality of New Orleans (1845) 11 Rob.
La. 97.
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arefully into the legal relations there existing between the parties.
Jnder the general statutes of the state the defendant possessed what is
ommonly termed the "power" of eminent domain. This included,
nter alia, rights on the part of the water company against the court
vhich hears condemnation proceedings that, upon the filing of the
)etition and the taking of all other steps, that court hear and determine
:he issues and further, if the findings are in favor of the company,
:ransfer to it the ownership of the land in question. The court-
;ubject to the possibility of abandonment, discussed above-would
:hen have a legal power to invest-the company with the title, and the
land-owner would be under a correlative liability to lose the same.
But in the principal case, while, upon the facts as assumed, the court
in which the condemnation proceedings were brought was under a duty
to hear and determine the issues, it was under no duty to pass the title
of the plaintiff's land to the water company, as the taking was for a
private purpose; nor, indeed, having found the purpose to be private,
did the court have the power to pass title. The situation is somewhat
comparable to that which exists when an ordinary private person asserts
an unfounded claim to the property of another. He has a right to
have the court pass upon the validity of the claim, but has no farther
rights when the court finds the issues against him. Under the common
law the bringing of such unfounded civil action is not tortious if the
plaintiff acts in good faith and with reasonable cause.
9 Indeed, in
many jurisdictions even want of probable-cause and "malice" do not
make the bringing of an unfounded civil action tortious.
10 But in the
principal case it was decided that whereas, as against the court, the
plaintiff was privileged to bring proceedings, and had a right that they
be heard; yet, as against the defendant, it was under a duty not to
initiate proceedings unless they were going to be successful; and it
was under this duty, seemingly, regardless of good faith or probable
cause; it brought suit at its peril. It clearly follows from this case
that the institution of such proceedings is wrongful as against the
defendant. But to argue that this conclusion had to be reached in the
case, for the reason that such proceedings were "wrongful" (which,
if the question be, as the court thinks, of first impression, can only
mean "ill founded and destined to end in failure") is sad discourtesy
to the venerable science of logic. However, the court's argument from
policy is persuasive: that a strict rule must be applied to these unusual
cases, so as to safeguard the public from abuse of the extraordinary
'Wetmore v. Mellinger (1884) 64 Iowa, 74r, x8 N. W. 87o; Betz v. Meyer
(i878, Sup. Ct.) 40 N. J. L. 252; McNamee v. Minke (1878) 49 Md. 122.
1°Cincinnati Daily Tribune v. Bruck (1899) 61 Ohio St. 489, 56 N. E. 198;
Muldoon v. Rickey (i883 ) 1o3 Pa. iio; Quartz Hill Gold Mining Co. v. Eyre
(1883) II Q. B. D. 689.
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"power" of eminent domain, and that therefore no "malice" need
be shown to support the action in the instant case."1
It may be asked whether the result here reached is consistent with
the long list of decisions permitting abandonment of condemnation
proceedings in the normal case. The difference may well lie in the
varying situation at the time of initiating the proceedings. In the
normal case there is both "reasonable and probable cause," and
absence of "malice"; while in the principal case the former element-
perhaps the latter also-seems on the facts to have been lacking. It is
not believed, for instance, that the Maine court would have extended
the rule in the instant case to cover a situation where the appropriator
stated all the facts in a petition brought under and within the language
of a statute, and later abandoned the proceedings only because of a
judicial determination that the purpose for which the legislature had
assumed to authorize the taking was not public within the meaning of
the Constitution. No case dealing with this precise point has been
found.
The situation in the principal case bears some analogy to that in
actions for 'malicious abuse of legal process." In the latter the
operative facts constituting the cause of action include, as in the
former, the use of legal process-arrest, attachment, subpoena, etc.-
for a purpose different from that for which they are given by the law.
But in such case the person committing the tort exceeds his legal
privileges only if he acts from a bad motive.1 2
Another, and perhaps the closest, analogy to the cause of action
recognized in the principal case is that allowed against judges of
inferior courts for acts done without jurisdiction. It is usually stated
that the judges of such courts determine the extent of their jurisdiction
at their peril and are liable for going beyond it, even though they act
in good faith and with probable cause,1 3 and this is substantially the
rule in the earlier common-law cases."4 Under such decisions the
' The common law sought to safeguard the privilege of "self-help"-a privi-
lege which exists only under unusual conditions-by conferring unusual remedies
upon persons likely to be injured by abuses of the privilege. The action ofreplevin was given to prevent abuse by landlords and others of the privilege ofdistraining chattels; the doctrine of trespass ab initio gave additional protection.
'Zinn, v. Rice (i8gr) i54 Mass. 1, 27 N. E. 772. Trespass ab initio in someof its aspects is a special form of abuse of process, resulting in a duty to paydamages not only for the abuse but also for acts and consequences which were
originally privileged because of the "leave and license given by law."
' Salmond, Law of Torts (4th ed. 1916) 530-531.
"4 Many of the more recent and better considered cases extend to the judge ofthe inferior court the same protection given to judges of courts of general juris-diction-a result in accord with sound policy and common sense. State v.Wolever (i89o) 127 Ind. 3o6, 26 N. E. 762; Banister v. Wakeman (i8gi) 64 Vt.203; Rudd v.-Dailing (1892) 64 Vt. 456, 25 Atl. 479. See Burdick, Torts (2d
ed. 1913) 38.
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:ourt has neither the power to take valid action, i. e., 
action binding the
itigants, nor the privilege-as against the litigants-to 
do the acts in
question, even if they are done in good faith and 
for probable cause.
This rule is but an illustration of the tendency 
of the common law to
subject persons charged with the administration 
of the law to the
payment of damages if they act beyond their 
powers, even if they do so
in good faith, and thus to secure the individual 
from arbitrary exercise
of governmental or quasi-governmental power. 
The result in the
principal case may perhaps be regarded as 
an unconscious extension of
this tendency to the case of public service 
corporations invested with
the extraordinary "power" of eminent domain.
TIME AND CHANGE AND CONSTITUTIONALITY
What if a statute is constitutional, admittedly? Born constitutional,
will it of necessity stay so forever? Is the 
seal of propriety, once set
upon it, immune from the destructive nibblings 
of the proverbial tooth
of time-proof against the abrasion and the 
weather-wear of changed
conditions? Is its constitutionality no longer 
open to attack? The
question recently came before the New York 
Court of Appeals inMuizic-
ipal Gas Co. v. The Public Servce"Commission 
(1919, N.Y.) 121 N.E.
772. Eleven years ago the state legislature 
passed an act fixing maxi-
mum charges for gas furnished in the City of 
Albany. The Municipal
Gas Company, admitting the constitutionality 
of the act, operated
* under it for some ten years. But conditions 
have changed, and the
cost of gas production has kept pace with 
that of living. Relief was
sought from the Public Service Commission, 
but the Commission was
without power to supersede the statutory 
rate.' The corporation
therefore recently brought suit for an injunction 
against further
enforcement of the old rates, alleging that 
they had become confis-
catory and involved the taking of its property 
without- due process of
law. The defendants demurred. Their 
contention was that the con-
stitutionality of a statute was fixed forever 
at its passage; that if it
was valid then, there was no room for 
question later. The court,
speaking by Cardozo, J., met the issue squarely. 
"A statute prescrib-
ing rates is one of continuing operation. It is 
an attempt by the legis-
lature to predict -for future years the charges 
that will yield a fair
return. The prediction must square with the 
facts or be cast aside
as worthless. It must square with them in one 
year as in another; at
the beginning but equally at the end. In all such 
legislation, from the
hour of its enactment, there thus inheres the seed 
of an infirmity which
the future may develop. . . . All that we can 
say at the outset is that
'People e.x rel. Municipal Gas Co. v. Public Service Cominission 
(i918) 224
N. Y. x56, i2o N. E. 132.
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the power to regulate exists . . . Into every statute of this kind we
are to read, therefore, an implied condition. The condition is that
the rates shall remain in force at such times and at such only as their
enforcement will not work denial of the right to a fair return. When
the return falls below, that level, the regulation is suspended. When
the level is again attaincd, the ditty of obedience revives."2
It is clear enough that a statute may, as to the same person-be con-
stitutional under one set of conditions and become unconstitutional
when its application is sought under another set of conditions existing
at the same time. An improvement tax levied on me as owner of lots
which front on the highway may be good, when it would be invalid if
assessed against me as proprietor of a section of the inaccessible hinter-
land. A requirement that I choose my subordinates only from civil
service lists may hold when enforced against me as commissioner of
highways, and meet an insuperable barrier when applied to limit the
free discretion given me by the state constitution, as commissioner of
canals.3 But the instant case appears to be the first to fit this principle
squarely to varying states of fact found not on a cross-section, but on
a longitudinal section of time; admitting the validity of a statute as
applied to a set of persons under one state of fact ten years ago, and
denying such validity as to the same persons under a different state
of fact found, not elsewhere ten years ago, but in the same place,
to-day.
Both the authority and the reasoning of the Court command respect.
Nor are there wanting in the law rulings sufficiently like that here in
question to make comparison worth while.
Time and again courts have admitted that a given common-law rule
may in its day have been good, that it has been the law; only to state
that with time's passage conditions have so changed that it is law no
more.4  This is done not willingly, nor even often; but it is done. An
instance is New Hampshire's refusal to further apply "in the twentieth
century" the rule derived from Coke's dictum, that part payment on
the day cannot be satisfaction." Not all courts 'are as frank when pro-
mulgating change as would be helpful. Sometimes the older cases
are ignored in the opinion.6 Sometimes a sacrifice is offered to their
2 121 N. E. 774. The italics are the editor's.
'See People ex rel. McClelland v. Roberts (1896) 148 N. Y. 360, 42 N. E. 1082.
'See Kambour v. Boston & Maine R. R. (1913) 77 N. H. 33, 86 Atl. 624,
especially at p. 42 (629) ; Thurston v. Fritz (1914) 91 Kan. 468, 138 Pdc. 625;
Manchester v. Hough (1828, C. C.) 5 Mason, 67, Fed. Cas. No. 9005.
'Frye v. Hubbell (19o7) 74 N. H. 358, 68 Atl. 325.
'See Ryan v. North Alaska Salmon Co. (19o8) r53 Cal. 438, 95 Pac. 862,
ostensibly quoting from and in reality utterly ignoring the holding in Wicker-
sham v. Johnston. (1894) 1o4 Cal. 407, 38 Pac. 89. This method of graceful
volte-face has commended itself to many courts. Cf. Chemical Natil. Bk. v.
Kellogg (19o5) 183 N. Y. 92, 75 N. E. X1O3, and Union Natl. Bk. v. Chapman
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high authority-lip service, empty-an admission that the 
older rule is
still sound, if fettered to the strict facts of the older case 
; and states
of fact are distinguished which are not distinguishable., 
Sometimes
conscious resort is had to legal fiction ;9 sometimes in the 
use of fiction
or word-juggling a conservative judge seems almost to 
befool him-
self.10  But, openly or covertly, the old rule has then 
been refused
enforcement, because it does not fit the facts born since its 
making.
Now and again a statute suffers the same fate. In 1781 a debtor 
in
South Carolina tendered his creditor shinplasters in payment 
of the
debt. The war act making them legal tender was not repealed 
till the
following year. But the court, when the case came to be litigated,
took notice of the fact that the paper was, at the time, worthless; 
and
that the emergency which called forth the legal tender act 
had passed.
The tender was held to have been of no effect.
11
It is not contended that mere non-user can vacate a statute, although
even on that point the few authorities are not at one.
12 But it is con-
tended -that the change in conditions which in most 
instances is the
cause of the non-user may turn to no-law what once 
was law, and
rightly so. In the common-law cases, as in the South 
Carolina case
referred to, what the court did was, at bottom, to refuse 
enforcement
to a "law" or "rule of law" as having grown into such 
violent con-
flict with the facts of later times that the court rebelled at the 
injustice
of its enforcement under the changed conditions.
(1902) I69 N. Y. 538, 62 N. E. 672. In Schuling v. Ervin (1918, 
Iowa) 169 N. W.
686, the procedure is applied not to reform, but to deform 
the law. We know
there, from the cogent dissenting opinion, that the 
awkward cases had been
presented to the court. See CuaRnNT DEcisioNS, infra, sub 
tit. BilLs AND NoTES.
See Grimoldy v. Wells (1875) L. P. 1O C. P. 391, on Couston 
v. Chapman
(1872) L. R. 2 H. L. Sc. 25o; and see cases cited in note 
8.
'So Regina v. Ion (1852, C. C. R.) 2 Den. C. C. 475, on Rex 
v. Shukard (18n1,
C. C. R.) R. & R. 200. Cf. Collins v. Voorhees (189o, 
Ct Err.) 47 N. J. Eq.
555, 22 Atl. 1054, and Schaffer v. Krestovnikow 
(ii8, N.-J. Ct. Err.) 1o5 At.
239, where the earlier case was damned with faint praise, 
being "affirmed" on a
wholly unessential point, with the implication that the 
facts in reality were
different.
'Copious examples may be found in the articles by Jeremiah 
Smith, Surviving
Fictions (1917) 27 YAiE LAW JoURNAL, 147; (I918) 
ibid. 317.
o Cf. for instance Lord Ellenborough in Lane v. Newdigate 
(18o4, Eng. Ch.)
Io Vesey, 192. Here may perhaps belong also Bowman 
v. Secular Society
(H. L.) [19171 A. C. 406.
' Williamson v. Bacot (1787, S. C.) i Bay, 62.
" That non-user and the development of general custom 
inconsistent with the
statute may repeal it as obsolete, see O'Hanlon v. 
Myers (1856, S. C.) IO Rich.
Law, 128; also Adams v. Norris (1862, U. S.) 23 How. 
353. Contra, Homer vi.
Commonwealth (1884) io6 Pa. 221. Other cases are 
collected in 44 Cent. Dig.
2803; but it will be found in almost every other case 
that the presence of con-
flicting statutes of later date, or of other complications, 
prevented the question
from being raised squarely; even in Adams v. Norris, 
while the question there
came fairly before the court, the circumstances are so 
peculiar that the case is
hardly a precedent.
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We have ways in our society, habits of thought and of action.
These ways seem good to us, so good that we visit penalties on those
who would infringe them. And nowhere are our ways so sharply
defined as in the law. We change, and our ways change with us, so
gradually oftentimes that we are as unconscious of the process as a
young child of its growth; we do not often stop for critical exafti-
nation and comparison, and the undefined admits of some adjustment.
But let our mores once be read into the law, be fixed by declaration of
the courts, and change grows difficult. A rule once settled is more
likely to be followed than examined. It is followed, let us say. Bit
by bit its inconsistency with newer ways of our society grows evident.
Still the judges follow, though now, it may be, with unwillingness, with
hints to the legislature that a change is due. "These be courts of law,
not courts of justice." For this too, despite exceptions, is of our
mores: that judges be conservative in innovation. But it is here con-
tended that this conservatism is not absolute. It has a limit, difficult
indeed to state, more difficult to prophesy in any individual case. But
when the conflict of the declared rule with our present ways passes that
limit, the rule must fall,-this, whether the rule be common law or
statute, whether declared a century since or yesterday. Not three
months back the Supreme Court of Iowa declared a "failure of legis-
lation" because a statute, if construed as it read, must not only fail
to reach, but would increase the evil it was passed to remedy. 13 What
is this but a denial that a "law" was law, because in its clash with the
mores of the day it overstepped the limit of the court's obedience? But
if in some cases of great pressure the court will deny its sanction to a
rule because that rule has thus come to clash with the ways of our
society,-if they will so deny force even to a statute which once, in its
own day, was fit and fair,--if they will deny it even though the mores
with which it clashes must be gleaned by the judges from the almost
formless flux of life about them,--how much more ready should be
that denial when the mos to be upheld is clear to see, accessible, crys-
tallized in that written body of our fundamental ways which we call
the Constitution?
If there be any soundness in this reasoning, the principal case was
well decided. A statute, then, which once was good may with altered
conditions become bad.
But that is not all. The bad may in that same way turn good, the
" (igg, Iowa) 17o N. W. 417. The "inter;retation" of statutes to fit the
mores is a less boisterous but equally apt example of the workings of the same
principle, as in the Statute of Frauds. Another current instance of the nullifica-
tion of statute law because of variance with the mores is the introduction of the
respondeat superior doctrine into the Canal Zone. Nominally a civil law code
prevails there. Biat the men living there were brought up under common law.
See infra, p. 598. On the whole process contended for in the text see Corbin
The Law and the Judges (1914) 3 YALE REVIEW, 234.
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unconstitutional turn constitutional; and this despite the determination,
in a court, of its unconstitutionality. Such a decision of a statute's
unconstitutionality the instant case affords. "When the return falls
below that level [of fairness], the [statutory] regulation is suspended."
It was so held. But, says the Court, "when the level is again attained,
the duty of obedience revives.'
1 4  Surely this dictum is heresy.
"When a statute is adjudged to be unconstitutional," says Judge
Cooley, "it is as if it had never been."
15 And yet-is not the dictum
a legitimate, albeit not a necessary, corollary to the decision? If a
statute may be good now and bad later, according to its application to
conditions which are in flux, why may it not, even though it is bad
now, become good a few years hence? First, what is the true effect
of adjudging a statute unconstitutional? Certainly, if the judgment
is final, it is a definite refusal to apply the statute betveen the litigant
parties, upon the litigated facts; that cause is forever set at rest. But
is the statute therefore dead? It has failed of one effect which was
within the intent of the legislature passing it; has it failed of all?
The Government is dissatisfied with the decision on the Legal Tender
Act; new judges are appointed; again, under the same Act, a case
comes up. This time the statute is held constitutional; it is found to
be in force; it is far from being, because of the prior judgment. as if
it had never been.
6
An act is passed creating certain offices in a municipality. Officers
are elected and take up their work. Not till then is the act tested and
declared unconstitutional. Have "rights not been built up under it?"'--
The officers were de facto; their acts, up to the time of the judgment,
stand. s Or again, it has been held that an officer may not be held-
liable criminally for doing in reliance on a statute later declared uncon-
24 121 N. E. 774. The italics are the editor's.
" Constitutional Limitations (7th ed., 19o3) 259. The passage has become a
classic statement of orthodox theory. It continues: "Rights cannot be built 
up
under it; contracts which depend upon it for their consideration are void; 
it
constitutes a protection to no one who has acted under it, and no one 
can be
punished for having refused obedience to it before the decision was made. And
what is true of an act void in toto is true also as to any part of an act which 
is
found to be unconstitutional, and which, consequently, is to be regarded as
having never, at any time, been possessed of any legal force." But this language
is practically negatived, for purposes of argument, by the notes. For if in 
one
or two instances the unconstitutional statute has legal force, no valid argument
can be made from its absolute nullity, when a novel case arises. What is
believed to be a sounder view of the effect of declaring an act unconstitutional
may be found in Allison v. Corker (iso2, Ct. Err.) 67 N. J. L. 596, 6oo ff., 52
Atl. 362, 363.
" See the Legal Tender Cases (i87o, U. S.) 12 Wall. 457.
'Cf. the language quoted in note I5, supra.
"'Buck v. Eureka (1895) o9 Cal. 504, 42 Pac. 243.
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stitutional, what would have been privileged, had the statute been
within the legislature's power.1
Sweeping language as to the flat nullity of a statute declared uncon-
stitutional will not, therefore, bear the test of actual decisions. Then
such sweeping language alone will not suffice to dismiss the dictum in
the instant case: that when the requisite change in external conditions
has come about, then under this very statute now held unconstitutional,
"the duty of obedience revives." We cannot simply say: the statute is
dead, there is no change which can give it life again. For we know
that a change in the Court's mind can give it life. Nor is that the only
source of resurrection.
New York passed an act providing for compensation for maritime
injuries. It was held unconstitutional; the "common-law remedy"
which states might give under the grant of admiralty jurisdiction "sav-
ing to suitors, in all cases, the right of a common-law remedy, when
the common law is competent to give it" did not extend to statutory
compensation. Congress amended the judicial Code to save to suitors,
in addition, their rights under state compensation acts. Then a steve-
dore was injured, before New York re-enacted the law previously held
bad. And it was held that with the removal of the impediment the
New York law sprang into force again.2-0  A change, then, in the
higher law which overrides a statute, may revive it; at least when
that higher law is a federal act.
Nor need the result be otherwise where the conflicting higher law
is the constitution of the state. Thirty years before, New York had
held that an act requiring all subordinate officials to be appointed from
the civil service lists was unconstitutional as applied to the canal com-
missioner, whose full discretion in such matters was provided for
by the constitution. 21 The Constitution was revised, the provision as
to the canal commissioner repealed-and the court found that the stat-
ute previously unconstitutional as to that official, now reached him. 22
And so, it seems, may be the case even with a change in law of equal
rank. A statute was passed in Massachusetts and held good; a new
one was passed, amending the old. But the new act was adjudged
invalid, and to have so incorporated the earlier one as to make both
unconstitutional. The second statute was repealed, without more;
the prior act was held thereby to have come again into vigor in all its
pristine innocence.23
'State v. Godwin (i898) 123 N. C. 697, 31 S. E. 221.
Ciminino v. John T. Clark & Son (i918, App. Div.) 172 N. Y. Supp. 478;
see (igig) 28 YALE LAW JOURNAL, 281. For the development of the law on the
point in that case see (1917) 27 ibid. 255; (i918) ibid. 924.
' People ex rel. Killeen v. Angle (1888) iog N. Y. 564, 17 N. E. 413.
2People ex rel. -McClelland v. Roberts (x896) 148 N. Y. 360, 42 N. E. 1o82.
'Lawton Sphnhig Co. v. Commonwealth (i99, Mass.) 121 N. E. 518.
YALE LAW JOURNAL
It has, then, been determined-and if by error, then by error so wide-
spread as to begin to constitute minority opinion-that change in the
court's mind, change in a higher conflicting law, change in an objec-
tionable companion law, may operate, without re-enactment, to breathe
life into a statute once adjudged unconstitutional. In each case the
reason was: that the change had removed the only bar. So 
here,
where the only bar is found in the surrounding facts, the cost 
of gas
producing. Why, with a statute made for the fixing of rates, a 
statute
"of continuing operation," a statute whose only flaw is non-conform-
ance with the facts of the moment, may not a change in those 
facts
to-morrow remove unconstitutionality?
Whether such a development as this is desirable is another question,
and, it may be, a debatable one. Are we, with every economic 
change,
to find our laws uncertain--on every revision of a constitution, 
are
we to examine ancient records to search out forgotten statutes 
whose
ghosts if this or that clause is repealed, will start forth 
to haunt the
halls of Justice? We have had undesirable experiences at 
times with
the repealing of repealing acts.
But, on the other hand, this dreaded resurrection of forgotten 
stat-
utes may prove to be more bugaboo than menace. 
We have our
jurisdictions where non-user of a statute is held to be without 
effect.
Unrepealed by the legislature, it still stands on the books: 
why, then,
it is in force. Faded out from all men's memory, sanded 
over with
the drift of years-but still in force. Let some adventurous 
treasure-
seeker strike upon it in his excavations, let him set it up-the 
courts
will recognize it still as law. Surely in such jurisdictions, if at all,
the evils to be feared from the unearthing of forgotten statutes 
would
be found and cried out upon. Yet even there we hear but 
rare com-
plaints. There seem, in practice, to have been but few legal archeolo-
gists at work a-troubling the unwary lawyers of the younger 
genera-
tion. It may be that, in the large, only the rather useful statutes 
are.
under such a rule, called back to life.
SOME RECENT DECISIONS OF THE UNITED STATES 
SUPREME COURT
Panama Railroad v. Bosse (March 3, 1919) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct.
Term, I918, No. 203, is an extraordinarily interesting 
case dealing
with the reception of the common law in the Canal Zone. The opinion,
written by Mr. Justice Holmes, furnishes an excellent example of 
the
application of the prevailing mores of a community to the settlement
of legal disputes. The precise point raised was whether the common-
law doctrine of the responsibility of a master for the torts of his 
ser-
vant committed within the scope of his employment could be applied
in its full extent to accidents happening in the Zone. Theoretically
the provisions of the Civil Code of the 'Republic of Panama are 
in
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force there. It was argued that this code as construed in civil law
countries would not cover the case in hand. The Supreme Court of
the Zone had held as early as 191o that it would look to the common law
in the construction of such Colombia statutes as were still in force
there ;' it had also held that, at least so far as railroads were concerned,
the common-law liability of master for servant would be applied.2
The District Court of the Zone accordingly allowed recovery in the
principal case. In affirming a decision of the Circuit Court of Appeals
upholding this, Mr. Justice Holmes argued that the common-law rule
in question was familiar to all the present inhabitants of the Zone-who
are chiefly employees of the Canal, the Panama Railroad Company,
etc.-and that therefore it ought to be applied unless it were neces-
sarily inconsistent with the provisions of the Civil Code, even if it
were to be conceded that the latter would have been construed differ-
ently by a court in a civil law jurisdiction. The result is both sensible
and sound.
The Harrison Narcotic Drug Act 3 purports on its face to be a
revenue law, but as is well known, its chief object is to prevent the
abuse of narcotic drugs. Under its provisions sales of the drugs in
question are confined to registered dealers and to those dispensing the
drugs as physicians, and to those who come to dealers with legitimate
prescriptions of physicians. The constitutionality of the law has
recently been upheld by the United States Supreme Court in United
States of America v. Dorentus (March 3, 1919) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct.
Term, 1918, No. 367. The Chief Justice and Justices McKenna,
VanDevanter and McReynolds dissented. The majority took the view
that it was not possible for the court to say that the provisions regulat-
ing the sales of these drugs in the manner specified had no reference to
the collection of revenue, as they did "tend to keep the traffic above-
board and subject to inspection by those authorized to collect the
revenue," as well as to "diminish the opportunity of unauthorized
persons to obtain the drugs and sell them clandestinely without paying
the tax imposed by the Federal law." The decision is an illustration
of the fact which Chief justice Marshall pointed out in McCullough v.
Mfaryland, that the power to tax is the power to destroy.
It is usually the employers who attack workmen's compensation laws
'Kung Ching Chong v. Wing Chang (igio) 2 Canal Zone Sup. Ct. Rep. 25, 30.
'Fitzpatrick v. Panama Railroad Co. (913) 2 Canal Zone Sup. Ct. Rep. iII,
121, 128.
'38 St. at L. 785, 6 U. S. Comp. St. 1916, sec. 6287g.
'Also in Webb et al. v. The United States (March 3, 1919) U. S. Sup. Ct Oct.
Term, 1918, No. 370.
' (1819) 4 Wheat. 316.
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as unconstitutional. In Middleton v. Texas Power & Light Co.
(March 3, 1919) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, i918, No. lO2, it was the
employee who was the complaining party. Under the Texas law which
was attacked an employer may elect whether he will come under the
Compensation Act or not. If he so elects, all his employees are ipso
facto under the act; they cannot work for him and claim damages on
common-law principles. The argument of the employee was that the
effect of this was to deprive him of the "equal protection of the laws"
as well as of "liberty and property" without due process of law. In an
unanimous opinion the Supreme Court negatived all these contentions,
on the ground that the employee was at liberty to refuse to work for
employers who had accepted the act and thus had his election. In sus-
taining the reasonableness of the resulting limitation. upoi the
employee's election, the Court called attention to the relative mobility
of labor as compared with that of capital, and emphasized the desirabil-
ity of a uniform rule applicable to all the employees of a given
employer so that he may provide the necessary liability insurance.
A railroad company obtains first a temporary and then a permanent
injunction restraining a state railroad commission from putting into
effect a schedule of rates adopted by the commission, on the ground
that the rates are so low as to be confiscatory. When the final decree
is entered the bond given at the time of the granting of the temporary
injunction is released and the sureties thereon are discharged from
liability. Over two years later the decree of the lower court is reversed
by the appellate court, with directions to dismiss the bill without preju-
dice, and the lower court is commanded to take such further proceed-
ings as may be "according to right and justice and the laws of the
United States." Under such a mandate may the lower court permit
shippers, consignees, and other persons similarly situated, to intervene
and claim a refund of the difference paid by them between the rates
prescribed by the commission and those kept in force by the railroad
company? This question is answered in the affirmative in the recent
case of Arkadelphia Milling Co. v. St. Louis & Southwestern Ry.
(March 3, 1919) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, 1918, No. 92. No case
precisely in point is cited by the Court. The decision is based upon
"the principle, long established and of general application, that a party
against whom an erroneous judgment or decree has been carried into
effect is entitled, in the event of a reversal, to be restored by his
adversary to that which he has lost thereby." To the argument that
the persons thus permitted to intervene are not in a position to invoke
this pritciple of restitution because they were not parties to the original
proceedings, the Court replied that "the point is unsubstantial," as
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the railroad commission in defending the rate schedules against attack
represented all shippers.6
An important question arising under the copyright statutes of the
United States was involved in L. A. Westermann Co. v. The Dispatch
Printing Co. (March 3, i919) U. S. Sup. Ct. Oct. Term, 1918, No. 50.
The plaintiff had separately copyrighted illustrations of styles of
women's apparel and had granted to various dealers exclusive licenses
to use the same within restricted areas. In advertisements inserted for
dealers who were not authorized to use the illustrations, the defendant
printed in its daily newspaper five of the copyrighted illustrations once,
and one of them twice-the latter for two different advertisers. The
questions raised were, whether there were seven distinct cases of
infringement or not, and, if so, what damages should be assessed,
where no particular amount was shown and the testimony established the
fact that it was not possible to make any real estimate of them. The
District Court held that there were seven cases of infringement, but
awarded only nominal damages of $io for each. The Circuit Court
of Appeals held that there was only one case of infringement, but
that, properly interpreted, the statute entitled the plaintiff to $250
damages. The Supreme Court took the view of the District Court
that there were seven cases of -infringement, but agreed with the Cir-
cuit Court that the plaintiff was entitled to $250 for each infringement.
The result hinged entirely upon the construction to be given to the
somewhat ambiguous wording of the statutes in question.
When reading decisions interpreting that clause of the Federal Con-
stitution which guarantees to citizens of one state all the privileges and
immunities of citizens in the other states, one sometimes wonders what
those who framed the clause in question would say of the result. The
recent case of LaTourette v. McMaster (1919) 39 Sup. Ct. i6o, is one
which raises doubts whether this particular clause of the Constitution
is accomplishing its purpose. A statute of South Carolina requires
all insurance brokers to take out a license, and limits the granting of
licenses to residents of the state. Under the Fourteenth Amendment
all American citizens are also citizens of the state in which they reside.
Although the result of the South Carolina statute therefore is to pre-
vent all citizens of other states from transacting the business in ques-
tion in South Carolina, the Supreme Court of the United- States in the
case cited held the statute constitutional, on the ground that it also
'Cf. (1919) 28 YALE LAW JoURNAL, 505, for another angle of the problem
here involved.
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excludes foreigners who reside in other states, and, on the other 
hand,
allows foreigners residing in South Carolina to engage in the 
business.
The discrimination, therefore, is not based upon citizenship 
but upon
residence. The result is probably consistent with other decisions 
inter-
preting the same clause, but one cannot help wishing that 
such dis-
criminations against citizens of other states were impossible 
under
our constitution. State boundary lines are, after all, imaginary 
lines.
Perhaps the lack of any method of interstate service of judicial 
process
may be the reason why such statutes are passed and upheld. 
However
this may be, Americans may profitably compare the ambiguity 
of our
constitution upon this point with the clarity of the corresponding 
pro-
vision in the fundamental law of Australia. The latter 
reads as
follows: "Sec. 117. A subject of the King, 
resident in any State,
shall not be subject in another State, *to any disability or discrimination
which would not be equally applicable to him 
if he were a subject of
the King resident in such other State." .Under such a provision 
the
South Carolina law would, as applied to citizens of other states, 
clearly
be unconstitutional. Australia, however, has also an adequate 
system
of interstate service of process, so that the resident of another 
state
may be sued in the state in which he entered into the transaction 
in
question.
" See (igig) 28 YALE LAw JOURNAL, 441.
